Military Factors Leading to Defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

Another paper written last year. This one was fun. Enjoy—or not.

INTRODUCTION

In the early months of 1967, both Israel and a loose coalition of Arab nations postured themselves for an inevitable conflict. By the first days of June, Israeli Defense Forces and the Arab coalition were at full-scale war. After less than a week of intense fighting by both sides in multiple campaigns, the IDF had achieved an overwhelmingly decisive victory over the Arabs. What military factors contributed to the quick Arab defeat?

A variety of secondary sources will be used to answer this question, include surveys of the entire war, as well as selected individual battles. Sources containing military theory, strategy, and tactics from varying eras and disciplines will also be used to introduce concepts described in each chapter, as well as form a basis for eventual conclusions. These sources will be used in combination to present a clear timeline of cause and effect that brought victory and defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

THE ROAD TO WAR

“Above all, a general should take care to have men of proven fidelity, wisdom, and long experience in military affairs…From such men a general may learn not only the state of his own army, but also that of the enemy’s: which of the armies is superior to the other in number, [and] which is the better disciplined…”
Niccolo Machiavelli

The road to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was paved by both wise and foolish men, and riddled with potholes of posturing and provocation. It began in the spring of 1967 near Syria’s Golan Heights. Israel was using its usual antagonistic tactic of driving armored tractors across the demilitarized zone in order to draw fire from the Syrians. This Syrian action would then justify the Israeli’s aggressive reaction. According to former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the tactic had been used with great success on many occasions , and did not fail to do so again on the morning of 7 April. An exchange of small-arms gunfire quickly escalated into Syrian positions suffering Israeli dive-bombers and Israeli settlements suffering Syrian artillery. By the end of the day, Israeli Mirage fighters were flying victory circles above the Syrian capital of Damascus after shooting down a pair of fighters over the city. The events of 7 April went far in exposing how unprepared Syria was for a war with Israel.

One large reason for the lack of Syrian armed capability is that its military was used as a stepping-stone for its politicians. Military leaders began ignoring their duties in favor of political aspirations. The purging of military commanders after successful military coups also adversely affected Syrian military might. This led to an over-reliance on Soviet officers to train and lead Syrian troops. Unfortunately for Syria, the Soviets would not always be in the Syrian picture.

7 April caused great concern for Syria’s main supporter, the Soviet Union. The following month, for reasons that are still under debate today, the USSR gave an Egyptian envoy false information about Israeli troop buildups along the Syrian border, and an impending Israeli invasion of Syria. This news sent the Egyptian general staff into immediate meetings on how to manage the situation. The Egyptians were obligated to respond because of a mutual defense agreement that had been signed by the two nations the year before. But economic problems combined with Egypt’s long-term involvement in Yemen’s civil war caused Egypt to be ill prepared for a conflict with Israel in 1967. Regardless of that fact, on 14 May Egypt and its president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, began hastily mobilizing for war. Nearly a third of its forces would be made up of reserve troops.

On 17 May, Egyptian jets flew over Israeli air space, prompting Israel to raise alert levels. Egypt had been pouring troops into the Sinai, and by 22 May Nasser barred Israeli shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba. To add insult to the action, Nasser boldly stated, “If Israel wishes to threaten war, we tell her, you are welcome.” The following day, Israel made it clear they were considering the invitation by fully mobilized its forces. Egypt began constantly changing its military mission between offense and defense. These changes in orders required thousands of men and material to relocate to different positions. The ever-changing postures put unnecessary strain on commanders and soldiers alike. To compound problems, once a strategy was finally decided, it was not anything the Egyptian commanders had previously planned for.

As Israel was mustering for war, its neighbor to the northeast was doing the same. “Syrian forces were at maximum strength and war footing” in the Golan Heights area. Israel’s leaders contemplated not only its shipping and politics, but its very survival. Debates began over the issue of when to go to war, and while some maintained an air of caution, others insisted that the time for war had come and preemption was the best course of action to take. Time, it was ultimately decided, was not on the side of Israel, and planning began. Yitzhak Rabin declared confidently, “First we’ll strike Egypt, and then we’ll fight Syria and Jordan as well.”

Jordan had received a recent sample of Israeli power late in the previous year during a raid on the border village of Samu, which had been accused of harboring terrorists. “The Jordanian army, a proud force that believed itself to be the best in the Arab world, had been humiliated,” and its leader, King Hussein, had been dreading war with Israel ever since. Realizing that Israel would use the Samu incident to continue attacks on Jordan, King Hussein decided the best option for his country was to form alliances with Egypt and Syria.

A main factor for Jordan in the Samu disaster, and for its military in general was that there were no division or corps level commanders. Fearing the potential popularity and power of the positions, King Hussein insisted that all upper-level orders come from Amman, and unfortunately for the Jordanian military, the general staff of Amman was weak and lacking. Yet, despite the fact that his nation was unprepared for war with Israel, Hussein had always been a strong believer in Pan-Arabism and wanted to honor the prior pact he had made. On 30 May he traveled to Cairo to meet with Egypt’s president Nasser and general Amer. The three men decided that Jordan would only be used to tie up Israeli forces that could be used against the other two nations, and Nasser assured the king that the Egyptian air force would aid Jordan in that effort. Before returning home, Hussein tried to convince Egyptian leaders that Israel was currently too powerful, and they “were risking disaster,” to which they replied, “We know what we’re doing.”

THE CAMPAIGNS

The armed conflict of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War can be divided into four distinct campaigns. The campaign for air supremacy was launched by Israel’s preemptive air strikes on its surrounding enemies, and set the tone for things to come. The Sinai campaign brought Israel and Egypt into direct conflict in the vast Sinai Peninsula. The West Bank campaign pitted Israel against well-defended Jordanian forces in and around the ancient city of Jerusalem. And the Golan Heights campaign put Israel in an uphill battle against the Syrian army and the very Heights as well.

Campaign for Air Supremacy
“The surprise is… not only the means to the attainment of numerical superiority; but it is also to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself, on account of its moral effect. When it is successful in a high degree, confusion and broken courage in the enemy’s ranks are the consequences…” Carl von Clausewitz

Israeli Defense Force doctrine preaches preemption and air superiority in order to protect its standard colossal mobilization efforts. On the morning of 5 June, Israel turned waiting into action by launching major preemptive air strikes against unsuspecting Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian targets. Israeli jets left their respective bases during the 7:00 hour to rendezvous near their planned targets. Israel had probed Egyptian air defense capabilities for months prior to the attack. These probes exposed Egypt’s air defense shortcomings, but also made Egyptians used to seeing Israeli aircraft in their skies. Thus, on the morning of the attacks, many assumed it was the usual harassment. The Israeli Air Force was further aided by a myriad of Egyptian errors. Expecting Israel to make dawn attacks, the Egyptian Air Force flew its normal dawn patrols and returned to base to enjoy a leisurely breakfast. Their jets sat unprotected on the tarmacs as pairs of Israeli aircraft swept down to attack runways, parked aircraft, and other targets of opportunity. Sorties were organized so that there was almost a constant wave of attacks.

Command and control of the Egyptian Air Force had completely broken down, due mainly to panic and lack of leadership. As the air strikes were in progress, EAF commander Gen. Mahmud Sidqui Mahmud and Field Marshal Amer were “flying over the Sinai in an unarmed transport.” The plane was unable to find a safe landing strip due to the attacks, and the commanders refused to give orders from the air for fear of discovery by the Israelis. Senior officers of air bases not under attack refused to take initiative in the absence of orders, offering no Egyptian counterattack or defense from the air. To compound matters, Amer, fearing being shot down by his own men, gave strict “no-fire” orders to all anti-aircraft batteries for that morning. Their gunners sat and watched as enemy aircraft flew overhead.

The results of the Israeli air strikes on Egypt were devastating to the EAF. Within the first thirty minutes, Egypt had lost nearly 200 aircraft, and by the end of the three-hour attack it had lost 286 of its 420 combat aircraft, nearly one third of its combat pilots had been killed, and 13 of its air bases had been rendered inoperable. Yitzhak Rabin received reports, “The Egyptian air force has ceased to exist.” In wiping out the EAF, Israel had lost a total of nine aircraft.

Egypt’s allies, Jordan and Syria, did not fair any better against Israeli air power. Near midday of 5 June, the Royal Jordanian Air Force mounted an ineffective attack against Israel where its pilots bombed the wrong targets. However, the Israeli counterattack was anything but ineffective. The IAF began its strikes against Jordan at Mafraq air base. The RJAF was consolidated at Mafraq and its aircraft sat on the ground, unprotected by hardened bunkers. Jordanian pilots offered little resistance, destroying only a handful of aircraft as their only fighter base was being completely destroyed. King Hussein claims that after the attack, “only the mess hall was standing.” Israel followed up the attack at Mafraq with a strike on Amman airport. The two and a half-hour attack at Amman finished off the Jordanian air force. It was left with no serviceable runways, and had lost all of its strike aircraft. On their way back to base, Israeli pilots destroyed a main radar station at Ajloun, and fired rockets on the royal palace of King Hussein. The king was uninjured, but his air force was completely destroyed.

Shortly after the Israeli strikes in Egypt, Egyptian officials informed their Syrian allies that “three-quarters of the IAF had been destroyed and that the Egyptian Air Force was pounding Israeli airbases.” The Syrians believed this blatant mistruth and decided to get in on the action by launching a strike force of their own against Israeli targets. The attack was completely unorganized and caused little to no damage to Israeli military installations. What the attack did succeed in doing was to give Israel a reason to retaliate, which it did with blinding force. The IAF attacked five major Syrian air bases along with their aircraft that were sitting in perfectly straight rows on their tarmacs. An Iraqi air base at H-3 was also attacked in the raid, as Iraq was aiding the Arabs in their air efforts. By the time the Israeli raid ended, two-thirds of the Syrian air force lay in ruin. In the first day of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Israel had destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The effort had cost them nineteen aircraft and nine combat pilots.

Sinai Campaign
“When you are driven from an initial position, you must reassemble your columns far enough to the rear that the enemy cannot hinder them, for the most troublesome thing that can happen to you is for your columns to be attacked in isolation before their assembling.” Napoleon Bonaparte

The Sinai Peninsula is a triangle-shaped chunk of desert east of the Suez Canal. From the Mediterranean Sea, its northern shore rises sharply into a mountain range that stretches to the Red Sea. There are but four routes to take that lead from one side of the range to the other. The northern-most route is the fastest, running parallel to the Mediterranean shoreline. The three remaining routes are mountain passes named the Tassa Pass, Gidi Pass, and Milta Pass. These routes would prove to be critical to the Sinai campaign in the coming days.

Egypt’s original defensive plan for the Sinai was codenamed Operation Victory. Victory used a defense-in-depth strategy that placed a considerable amount of forces in the rear. However, Nasser scrapped this plan because it essentially gave up defense of the Gaza Strip. Instead, Nasser opted for a plan that put more emphasis on the front line, named Operation Conqueror. Conqueror displayed a defensive posture, but offensive maneuvers could be integrated into the plan. Tens of thousands of men were rushed into the Sinai, but they were not given concrete objectives. To make matters worse, Israel was monitoring Egyptian troop movements, and was fully aware of Nasser’s plans for defending the region.

Operation Conqueror called for three entrenched lines of defense running from north to south. The first line, consisting of the Shazli armored, 2nd, 7th, and 20th infantry, and 6th mechanized divisions, was to be used as bait for an Israeli frontal assault. The second line, the 3rd infantry division, was heavily fortified, and was to be used for counter-attack after Israel swallowed the bait. The 4th armored division was placed in the rear as the third line to protect the mountain passes leading to the canal. In total, Egypt had 950 tanks, 1,100 armored personnel carriers, 1,000 artillery pieces, and 100,000 men in the Sinai. Their weapons consisted largely of old Soviet T-34/85 and T-55 battle tanks, however, the artillery, anti-tank, and APCs were all modern weapons. General Amer placed many of his inexperienced friends in important positions to lead a great deal of these men, one-third of whom were reserve troops.

Israel sent approximately 70,000 men and 700 tanks against the numerically superior Egyptian force. Supported mainly with British Centurion and US Sherman and Patton tanks, the men would be transported with unarmored M-3 halftracks. These forces were divided into four battle groups named Tal, Sharon, Yoffe, and Mendler after their respective commanders. The Tal armored division was responsible for penetrating the Gaza Strip, then proceeding along the northern route to the Suez Canal. The Sharon armored division was charged with penetrating the Egyptian line at Abu Agheila, then moving east to secure the Milta and Giddi passes. The Yoffe armored division was a security force protecting the inner flanks between the Tal and Sharon divisions. And the Mendler armored brigade had the duty patrolling the border into Israel’s Negev Desert, which also served as a ruse to cause Egypt to believe Israel would repeat its southern attack plan of 1956. The Israeli forces were given 24 hours to penetrate the Egyptian main line of defense.

As Tal’s armored division entered the Gaza Strip, many Egyptian troops mistook the Israelis for their own forces. However, once the Egyptians came to their senses, heavy fighting slowed the IDF advance. Intense fighting outside Rafah forced Israeli artillery and air power to enter the fray, scattering Egyptian forces in a route. By nightfall, the Tal division had reached the outskirts of Al-Arish. Further hard fighting ensued near Al-Arish, with Tal’s forces finally breaching the final Gaza defenses in the early morning of 6 June. The IDF was so far ahead of its timetable that forces allocated for the Sinai campaign were diverted to Jerusalem. The increased pace was largely assisted by Egypt’s failure to maneuver or counter-attack against the invading Israelis.

While the Tal division was invading the Gaza Strip, the Sharon division was headed for “the key to the Sinai,” Abu Ageila. The defense of the Abu Ageila area was left to the best infantry division in the entire Egyptian army. Sharon first softened the fortified positions around Abu Ageila with a massive artillery barrage, and then went in with superior numbers, hitting Abu Ageila and Umm Qatef with flanking maneuvers. “Surprise, shock, and confusion” set in as the elite Egyptian force was completely overwhelmed by the direction of the attacks. Sharon then called in troops from Israel that he had left in reserve, and the entire force completely encircled the area. Egypt’s reserves in the area “sat motionless” as the elite Egyptian infantry unit was destroyed.

The Yoffe division spent its first few hours of the campaign negotiating unguarded sand dunes Egypt believed to be impassable. After nine hours, the armored division was in position between the Tal and Sharon divisions. During the night it blocked roads and prohibited any lateral movement or reinforcement by the Egyptians. In the early morning hours of 6 June, Yoffe’s battle group met with the Sharon division near Djebel Libni, where they battled the Egypt’s second line of defense in the Sinai.

After forcing Egypt to believe Israel would invade from the south, the Mendler armored brigade met heavy resistance when it invaded the Sinai. Following its eventual breakthrough, the brigade traveled east to guard the southern flank of the Sharon division, keeping the Egyptian Shazli division at bay. By the morning of 6 June, all four Israeli battle groups had broken through Egypt’s main line of defense.

Amer panicked as Egypt’s lines crumbled, and in the afternoon of 6 June he ordered a general retreat of all forces in the Sinai. No orders were given for a phased withdrawal or strategic retreat, all units were simply directed to fall back across the Suez Canal immediately. Egyptian command and control quickly broke down and chaos soon followed as the rush west began. In their haste to get through the passes and to the canal, many units left their tanks and equipment behind. Israel’s speed and mobility allowed it to take advantage of the disorder, and all four of its battle groups began funneling the Egyptians toward the center of the Sinai. By 7 June the Israelis were racing to beat the retreating Egyptians to the vital mountain passes. While a few small units were able to eventually make it across the Suez, most were annihilated by Israeli air and ground forces on 8 June. Those men who were not killed were captured in the weeks that followed. At 12:30 the morning of 9 June, Israel reached the Suez Canal. The Egyptian army had been virtually destroyed in a matter of four days. Israeli casualties were approximately 1,250 dead and wounded. For Egypt, the numbers were much higher; 20,500 men dead, wounded, or captured, and the loss of nearly 80% of its equipment.

The West Bank Campaign
“In choosing allies, make sure that they are not only willing to help, but have the power to do so” – Aesop

Jordan had their own Operation Victory, which unlike Egypt, they enacted in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The border with Israel was too large to defend outright, so Jordan’s defensive strategy was to defend Israel’s expected axes of advance through a series of valleys, while at the same time capturing the Jewish section of Jerusalem to be used for land negotiations after the war. Israel was expected to launch a pincer attack to encircle the West Bank, going through Jenin, Nablus, and the Jordan Valley in the north, and Jerusalem, Jerico, and the Jordan Valley in the south. To defend against the invasion, Jordan had approximately 45,000 men, 270 tanks, and 200 pieces of artillery that were divided into nine brigades and a number of independent supporting battalions. Individual battalions were placed near Janin and Jerusalem, as well as in corridors between Jerusalem and Latrun, Jerusalem and Hebron, and in the Jordan Valley between Jerusalem and Jerico. Each brigade was to be supported by both armor and artillery battalions. A further 150 tanks from Iraq were expected to aid in the defense of the West Bank.

Jordan was correct in its assumption that Israel would plan a pincer move to take the West Bank, and in the routes to be taken. The IDF had about 40,000 men and 200 tanks divided into several brigades to throw at the Jordanian defenses. One infantry brigade would be used to attack through Jenin and Nablus, while another was securing Jerusalem with the support of a brigade of paratroopers. A mechanized infantry brigade would be used to attack through Ramallah, and then link up with the forces at Jerusalem. Two more infantry brigades were to be used to secure the southern portion of the West Bank and defend against any Jordanian counter-attack or reinforcement attempts from that direction.

Things went bad for Jordan almost immediately. Late in the morning of 5 June, Jordan received calls from Egypt’s Amer and Nasser claiming that Israeli forces in the Sinai were being destroyed, and Egypt was moving on the Negev. As requested, Hussein redeployed the armored brigade guarding Hebron to link up with the reported Egyptian forces nearing Bersheeba. Nasser assured Hussein that Syrian forces would be redeployed to fill in the gaps. Later that afternoon, Jordan began shelling Israeli positions in West Jerusalem, while taking strategic positions in and around the city. Israel counter-attacked with missile strikes on key positions inside the city, then systematically began to surround Jerusalem sector by sector. Realizing Israel was far from defeated, Hussein recalled his forces from the Negev and sent them to support the effort at the ancient city. But they would arrive too late to have any effect. Jordanian troops in Old Jerusalem began running away at the sight of Israeli forces, and by late afternoon of 6 June Israel had surrounded that portion of the city. Jordan’s battle for Jerusalem was lost.

Meanwhile, Israel had begun its invasion of the West Bank along the very axes Jordan expected. However, the advanced knowledge did little to ease the minds of Jordanian forces, who often turned and ran at the slightest hint of Israeli maneuvering. One by one, with heavy air support, Israel captured the intended objectives in its pincer attacks in the north and south of the West Bank. By the morning of 7 June, the West Bank was virtually surrounded and the Jordanians in full retreat. That night Jordan and Israel accepted a ceasefire proposed by the United Nations. In two day’s time, Jordan had lost the West Bank. The campaign brought Jordan approximately 25,000 dead and wounded men, and the loss of 200 tanks and 150 artillery pieces. The effort cost Israel about 1,700 dead and wounded, and 100 tanks, many of which were quickly repaired and sent into battle against Syria. The Arab support promised to Jordan failed to materialize, due to either arriving too late or by Israeli air and armor interdiction.

Golan Heights Campaign
“…The presence…of a situation favorable to ourselves and unfavorable to the enemy does not mean that we have already defeated him. Such conditions…provide the possibility for our victory…but do not constitute the reality of victory…This is the sole task…of a counter-offensive.” Mao Tsetung

Syria also believed the Egyptian claims of victory in the Sinai on 5 June. Upon hearing the distorted news, the Syrians launched strike aircraft against targets inside Israel. However, these strikes were greatly uncoordinated, as well as ineffective. The following morning, Syria began shelling settlements and reinforcing troops along its border with Israel. By the end of the day, Syria had initiated a ground attack into the Hula Valley that was quickly driven back with Israeli armor, artillery, and aircraft. This quick failure led the Syrian command to shelve its attack plans and bring out its defensive plan, known as Operation Jihad.

Operation Jihad called for a tiered defense of the Golan Heights along the expected Israeli axes of advance. Syria had approximately 70,000 men 550 tanks and assault guns, 500 armored personnel carriers, and 300 pieces of artillery to hold back the Israeli battle groups coming at them. These troops were largely from a professional standing army, and were not reserves. To breach the fortified defenses on the Golan Heights, Israel employed 20,000 men, 250 tanks, and the full power of the Israeli Air Force. After enduring four days of Syrian shells falling on Israeli settlements, the two forces would clash on the morning of 9 June.

The 9 June Israeli attack on the Golan Heights was preempted by a massive air strike by the IAF that would prove to be the biggest air assault on ground troops of the entire war. At mid-morning Israeli troops and armor began ascending the Heights. The rough terrain quickly caused problems for the IDF, with many tanks getting stuck in ditches, stuck on rocks, or simply rolling back down the hill. Those tanks that did manage to scale the Golan were funneled into bottlenecks by the terrain. Yet, the Syrians failed to take initiative during the Israeli misfortunes, and offered no counter-attack whatsoever. Rather than issuing attack orders, field commanders begged for artillery fire support. But that support never came, as the Syrian high command chose to continue shelling Israeli settlements along the border. The artillery would eventually shift its targets, but it was too little, and too late. By the end of 9 June, Israel had captured the northern portion of the Golan plateau. Realizing it was only a matter of time before the rest of the plateau was lost, the Syrian General Staff was “in a state of chaos,” and recalled many of its troops to guard the capital. On 10 July Israeli forces systematically removed those who held their positions on the Heights. When the Syrian command reported the fall of al-Qunaytarah, most of its remaining troops on the Golan turned and ran away. The night of 10 June, Israel accepted a ceasefire. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was over.

CONCLUSION

Many factors contributed to the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, some of which had greater impact than others. As the lesson of Machiavelli points out, one large factor before the war began was the lack of competent military commanders in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt’s Amer placed cronies in important military positions, rather than experienced officers. Jordan’s King Hussein was afraid military commanders would gain popularity, so he did not allow many in the military. Syrian military commanders turned into politicians as soon as they became popular. Egypt’s military posturing without intent of backing up the challenge was also a huge mistake. Perhaps the biggest Arab failure before the war began was overconfidence, and the failure to heed Hussein’s warning that Israel was too strong for the Arabs to defeat at that time.

The failure to recognize the Israeli potential for surprise was the major Arab error in the campaign for air supremacy. Von Clausewitz notes that the surprise is important enough to be “regarded as a substantive principle in itself.” The Arabs disregarded the possibility for an Israeli surprise attack, and paid a significant price for that error. With their air forces destroyed, they were unable to defend the skies overhead, or their ground forces from air attack. This placed Arab troops at a huge disadvantage, and tipped the scales tremendously in favor of Israel.

Egypt committed many errors in the Sinai campaign, but the failure to plan out a strategic retreat was perhaps the most damaging. Napoleon’s lessons for retreat and redeployment of troops concentrations would have saved many Egyptian lives, and could have potentially saved the Sinai campaign for Egypt. Instead, Amer’s unorganized retreat left troops vulnerable to the speedy tactics of the Israeli Defense Forces. Had proper attention been paid to the retreat, troops could have reassembled and launched a counter-attack against Israel.

Jordan’s many tactical errors are overshadowed by Hussein’s mistake in being over reliant on his allies. Defense of Jordan was largely dependant on Egyptian and Iraqi air support, as well as Syrian and Saudi armor support. Ultimately, none of these support promises would be met, primarily due to Israeli air interdiction. Hussein’s pan-Arabism led him into decisions he knew were not sound. Those decisions were based on the assurances of his Arab allies. Had Hussein followed the moral of Aesop’s “The Lion and the Dolphin,” he would have recognized the shortcomings of his allies, and how much weight to give their promises.

Syria squandered the greatest opportunity given to the three Arab states when it failed to take advantage of Israel’s misfortunes as it ascended the Golan Heights. The disarray of the IDF presented a golden opportunity for a Syrian counter-attack from an elevated position, which is a very favorable position in military tactics. However, as Mao Tsetung points out, being presented with opportunity means nothing if the opportunity is not immediately seized and properly utilized.

Ultimately, the largest overall mistake of the Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was that they failed to work together against Israel. Had Egypt, Jordan, and Syria cooperated with one another and attacked Israel en mass, their superior numbers would have forced Israel to defend three fronts at once, rather than allowing it the luxury of attacking three fronts at its own pace. The posture of Israel would have been required to change from offense to defense, forcing it to react to what its enemy was doing, instead of forcing its enemy to react to what it was doing. Together, these factors greatly contributed to the Arab’s swift defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.